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Agins v. City of Tiburon: Open Space Zoning
Prevails-Failure to Submit Master Plan Prevents
a Cognizable Decrease in Property Value
This casenote examines the Supreme Court's struggle to reconcile its fo-
cus on the facial validity of a zoning ordinance with the traditional "tak-
ing" approach requiring diligent factual inquiry. While the Agins Court
reiterates such an approach, the author notes the Court's departure from
important constitutional and precedential considerations. The author of-
fers a possible explanation for the departure, concluding that the Agins de-
cision apparently makes plan submission a prerequisite for
acknowledging economic loss and strongly implies a requirement of com-
plete loss of all property value before a compensable taking will be recog-
nized.
Apart from its people, a country's single greatest resource is the
land within its boundaries. It is on this land that the people must
live and from its bounty that they must survive. There is little
doubt that so valuable and vital a resource must be regulated to
some degree in order to promote the good of all concerned. How-
ever, a problem arises where the land to be regulated is privately
owned by citizens whose rights in such property are protected by
the United States Constitution. The difficulty is deciding where
regulation ends and confiscation, requiring government compen-
sation, begins. Believing that the United States Constitution
holds the answer, landowners continue to claim the protection of
constitutional guaranties, while the courts struggle to interpret
those guaranties.
The regulation contested in Agins v. City of Tiburon' was an
open space zoning ordinance, which rezoned appellants' property
calling for a density of not more than one home per acre. In de-
termining whether or not the ordinance represented a taking of
private property for public use without just compensation, the
United States Supreme Court held that there was no taking and
that the ordinance was therefore constitutional on its face. 2
To criticize the Court because it found no taking in Agins is not
the purpose of this analysis. For any negative comment found
herein could also be offered had the Court decided that there was
a taking. This note will examine the constitutional, factual, and
1. 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
2. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
precedential backdrops against which Agins was decided, evalu-
ating the Court's methods and decision in light of these consider-
ations.
I. THE CONSTrrTIONAL SETTING
Zoning regulations perform an important and necessary func-
tion in a modern society. Given the complexity of everchanging
conditions and priorities within such a society, those responsible
for the formation and enforcement of zoning regulations must be
afforded some degree of flexibility so that they may adequately
meet their responsibilities. They must, however, stay within con-
stitutional boundaries. 3
Faced with the task of determining whether or not the Tiburon
city ordinance violated the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court turned its attention to the fifth amendment,4
which is made applicable to state action by the fourteenth amend-
ment.5 The purpose of the fifth amendment is to prevent govern-
ment from forcing an individual landowner to bear burdens
"which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."6- By socializing the cost through compensation and
distributing the individual's loss throughout the community, the
property owner whose land has been taken for public benefit is
thereby granted relief. 7 This is not to say that all zoning ordi-
nances give rise to situations requiring compensation. The ordi-
nance itself may provide for a socialization of the burden. Such is
the case when the burden is evenly shared among all similarly
situated owners and the "harmed" individuals substantially bene-
fit from other aspects of the zoning.8
3. See generally Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (gov-
ernment's power to interfere with the rights of a landowner through zoning regula-
tion is not unlimited); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
4. "No person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. The fifth amendment's protection against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation has been incorporated by judicial interpreta-
tion into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This means that
the individual is protected from state action as well as federal. Chicago B. & O.R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897). The California State Constitution
provides additional protection and states in relevant part that "private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." CAL.
CONST., art. I, § 19.
6. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
7. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
379 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303,
475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1970)).
8. See generally Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Regardless of modern conditions, the meaning of the United
States Constitution remains constant. "[T] he meaning of consti-
tutional guaranties never varies, [but] the scope of their applica-
tion must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation."9 At first glance the meaning of the constitutional
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation appears clear and unambiguous. How-
ever, realizing that government could no longer function if it had
to pay a private owner every time any incidental property right
was effected by a zoning ordinance,' 0 the Supreme Court has en-
gaged in that interpretive process called "application." While the
Court cannot change the meaning of the Constitution, the Court
can legitimately give constitutional guaranties an expanded or
contracted" application.12
Those that argue for strict construction of the Constitution urge
that the word "taken" means a physical appropriation, and that
the original draftsmen never "conceived of the possibility that a
regulation of the use of land could be considered a taking."13 Pro-
fessor Cormack has summarized the founding fathers' definition
of a "taking" as "a purely physical conception."14
The greatest weight of authority, however, is not in favor of
such a strict interpretation, which requires a physical taking in
order to trigger fifth amendment protection.' 5 "The modern, pre-
vailing view is that any substantial interference with private prop-
erty which destroys or lessens its value (or which the owner's
right to its use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged
or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a 'taking' in the constitutional
9. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
10. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
11. 272 U.S. at 387.
12. It is sometimes difficult to tell where application ends and redefinition be-
gins. Justice Black has noted, "[The Court] proceeds on the premise that a major-
ity of this Court can change the Constitution day by day, month by month, and
year by year, according to shifting notions of what is fair, reasonable and
right .. " Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 844 (1971).
13. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE 238 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as BOSSELMAN].
14. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L. J. 221,
225 (1931).
15. "[W Ie do not embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur un-
less government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25 (1978).
sense, to the extent of damages suffered."16
Many state legislatures feared that the term "taken" would be
given strict interpretation. In response to the inequities which
might result from such a narrow judicial interpretation, a large
number of state constitutions, including California's, further pro-
vide that property shall not be damaged without just compensa-
tion.17
According to the weight of authority, activation of fifth amend-
ment guarantees is not limited to instances where there has been
an actual appropriation.' 8 "Property" does not stand for the tangi-
ble aspect of land alone. In its legal definition, "property" encom-
passes a bundle of rights inherent in the owner's relation to the
physical land. These rights include possession, use, and disposi-
tion.19 After announcing this broad definition, the Court pro-
ceeded to say that constitutional provisions are "addressed to
every sort of interest the citizen may possess." 20 Use, therefore,
which a zoning ordinance seeks to regulate, is an attribute of land
ownership worthy of constitutional protection.21
II. THE FACTUAL SETTING
The appellants purchased five acres of unimproved residentially
zoned property located in Tiburon, California, a small city on the
northern edge of San Francisco Bay,22 for the purpose of residen-
tial development. After the purchase, the City of Tiburon was re-
quired by state law to prepare and adopt general land use and
open space plans.23
16. 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3d ed. rev.
1980).
17. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1462-63, (1978);
see also Note, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 866-67 (1973).
18. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 804-08 (1950) (tak-
ing of agricultural use is considered a taking within the meaning of the fifth
amendment); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 123 n.25 (1928) (a taking
can occur even where government has transferred no physical control over a por-
tion of land); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,' 260 U.S. 393, (1922): "To make it com-
mercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
19. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
20. Id. at 378.
21. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (the flight of government
aircraft over Causby's land so interfered with the use of the property for a chicken
farm that it worked a taking of an easement); Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (intense air pollution so deprived the landowner of use and
enjoyment of his property that the pollution was held to effectuate a taking).
22. Tiburon is actually a peninsula surrounded by navigable waters on three
sides.
23. The state law required that:
[Tihe plan shall include the following elements:
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In early 1972, Tiburon enlisted the services of Dean Witter &
Co., Inc. to help the city prepare a financing plan for the acquisi-
tion of open space lands. Specifically identifying the Agins' land
as suitable for open space acquisition, the Witter plan suggested
that Tiburon issue city bonds in order to pay for open space ac-
quisitions. Tiburon followed the advice and used a part of the
bond proceeds to purchase a parcel of property adjoining the
Agins' land.
Effective June 28, 1973, Tiburon enacted two zoning ordi-
nances 24 which modified existing requirements. Under the new
ordinances, the Agins' property was designated as "Residential
Planned Development and Open Space Zone," meaning that the
land could be used only for one-family dwellings, accessory build-
ings, and open space uses. 25 The new zoning further provided
that not more than one dwelling per acre could be constructed.
Tiburon then filed an action in eminent domain against the
Agins to purchase their five acres for open space on December 4,
1973. Almost a year later, in November 1974, the city filed notice
that it was abandoning the eminent domain action. It was not un-
til May 1975, that the eminent domain action was officially dis-
missed.
Before submitting a master plan 26 for the development of their
(a) A land use element which designates the proposed general distribu-
tion and general location and extent of the uses of the land for housing,
business, industry, openspace . . . and other categories of public and pri-
vate uses of land. The land use element shall include a statement of the
standards of population density and building intensity recommended for
the various districts and other territory covered by the plan.
(e) An openspace element as provided in Article 10.5 (commencing with
Section 65560) of this chapter.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(a)(e) (West Supp. 1980).
24. TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S., 124 N.S. (1973).
25. The Tiburon zoning ordinance defines "Open Space Use" as the use of the
land for "public recreation, enjoyment of scenic beauty, conservation of man and
his artifacts, and containment and structuring of urban development." TIBURON,
CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S., § 10-4 (1973).
26. Perhaps the appellants chose to file the action before preparing and sub-
mitting a master plan, due to the economic waste which would be involved in pre-
paring a development plan which they knew would not meet zoning requirements.
The new zoning ordinance required that prior to any grading or improvement, an
owner must submit to the city a master plan together with the required fee.
TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S., § 10-4 (G) (1973). The ordinance requires the
master plan and text to be prepared by qualified practitioners in city planning, ur-
ban design, architecture, landscape, and engineering. Id. at (G) (1) (a). The ordi-
nance further provides that a master plan shall include, among other
land, the Agins brought suit against the City of Tiburon seeking
damages 27 for inverse condemnation and a declaration that the
zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. They claimed
that the ordinances were confiscatory 28 because the property had
lost all its economic use and value for any of the three uses per-
mitted by the ordinance. Appellants further claimed that the new
zoning had -prevented any sale, transfer, use, or development of
any part of their property.
Tiburon demurred to the complaint, claiming that it failed to
state a cause of action. The Superior Court sustained the city's
demurrer and the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding: a
landowner questioning the validity of a zoning ordinance may not
sue for inverse condemnation, but is limited to the remedies of
mandamus and declaratory relief; and that the zoning ordinance
in question did not deprive appellants of their property without
just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment.29 The ap-
pellants then brought the matter before the United States
Supreme Court, which addressed only the taking question and af-
firmed the California court's decision, "holding that the ordinance
on its face does not take the appellants' property without just
compensation." 30
III. JUDICIAL SETING
Although Agins had been preceeded by a long line of zoning
and taking cases, there was no predetermined formula which the
Court was bound to follow.31 The Supreme Court "has been un-
requirements, a general site plan showing existing and proposed locations and
uses of all structures and areas; lot design; circulation systems; preliminary grad-
ing, drainage, landscaping, and elevations; a statement of concepts indicating how
the development "satisfies relevant human needs for open space, view, and vari-
ety"; a proposal for dedication and/or for improvement; and maintenance of open
space, circulation ways, view easements, and public recreation areas. Id. at
(G)(1)(b).
27. The appellants claimed damages in the amount of $2,000,000, based on the
fair market value of the five acres, plus the deprivation and loss of use to the date
of the commencement of their action against Tiburon.
28. Providing for the permanence of open space, the ordinance in question
sets forth the following requirement: "Land to be preserved as open space shall
be maintained as permanent open space by dedication to the city of fee title or of
scenic easement by deed restriction .. " TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S.,
§ 10-4(E) (1973).
29. 24 Cal. 3d at 269, 277, 598 P.2d at 26, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373, 378.
30. Since the Court found no taking, it did not reach the question of "whether
a state may limit the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken
without just compensation." 100 S. Ct. at 2143.
31. The Court has set forth a four-part test in deciding what constitutes a com-
pensable taking. The four components of the test are legitimate state interest,
substantial relationship, economic impact on landowner, and balancing private
loss against public gain. Each of these components is employed in the Agins deci-
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able to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than remain dis-
proportionately concentrated on a few persons."32 There are,
however, six basic themes of precedential value running through-
out decisional law on the taking issue.
The first of these common themes is the Court's reliance on the
facts particular to each case. In taking cases the Court prefers a
case by case determination, observing that whether or not govern-
ment action should be rendered a taking "depends largely upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case."33
Beginning in 1922, with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,34 the
sion. The first two components resemble the considerations involved in the tradi-
tional rational basis test which is used as the standard of review where economic
interests are concerned. Rational basis requires that the private interest shall be
denied to promote a legitimate state purpose by means of an act reasonably neces-
sary to achieve that legitimate purpose. While the first consideration of rational
basis and the first component in the taking test are identical, where the relation-
ship element is concerned, the taking test imposes the stricter requirement of sub-
stantial relationship. 272 U.S. at 395. "Such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare." Id.; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) "Such
restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 188. In Agins, the Court cites
Nectow stating that zoning effects a taking if it does not substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests. 100 S. Ct. at 2141. The Court also cites the Euclid require-
ment for a substantial relationship to further a legitimate state interest. Finally,
the Court found that the challenged ordinance in Agins "substantially advances
legitimate governmental goals." Id.
The application of the rational basis test to cases where compensation is sought
is a mere formality if a taking is not found. In other words, the Court's first matter
of business is to determine whether or not a taking requiring compensation has
occurred by use of the four-part taking test. If the Court finds a taking, then the
fifth amendment offers the required solution of just compensation. However, if the
Court finds no taking, then the challenged action is labeled as regulation which
need only meet the rational basis standard of review. Since the action must have
already met the requirement of legitimate state purpose and the stricter require-
ment of substantial relationship under the taking test, a formal reapplication of ra-
tional basis is unnecessary.
32. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
33. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124, concerned a
landmark preservation law which designated plaintiffs' property as a historic
landmark and prevented plaintiffs from constructing a multistory office building
above the historic building. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155, 168 (1958), involved a temporary order from the War Protection Board calling
for the cessation of all nonessential gold mines to conserve equipment and man-
power for war uses.
34. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Court recognized that the question of when an action reaches a
magnitude equal to a taking depends upon the particular facts.35
Then, in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,36 the Court
noted that the traditional approach for determining a taking issue
turns upon the particular circumstances of each case.3 7 Even in
recent taking cases,3 8 the Court has recognized the need to en-
gage in factual inquiry. In Penn Central Transportation v. New
York City, the Court said that in assessing the particular circum-
stances of each case, it must engage in certain factual inquiries. 39
The Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,40 made the same de-
termination.4 1
The second recurring theme is that government regulatory ac-
tion must advance a legitimate state purpose. A legitimate state
interest is one that tends to promote the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the public.42 Throughout the decisions in vari-
ous zoning cases, the Court has recognized a wide variety of inter-
ests as legitimate. In Penn Central, the Court held that an
ordinance aimed at the preservation of a historic landmark re-
flected a legitimate state interest.43 The Court has also found that
a zoning ordinance providing for the segregation of residential,
business, and industrial buildings is in the interest of public
safety.44 Indeed, the Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,45
went so far to say that "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, peo-
ple few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in
a land use project addressed to family needs."46
The Court has given legitimate state interest a broad interpreta-
tion in zoning cases. Perhaps this is due to its lenient treatment
of legitimate state interests in other cases where government reg-
ulation has been challenged. After a long line of cases striking
down various governmental economic regulations 47 on the basis
35. Id. at 413.
36. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
37. Id. at 168.
38. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);°Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
39. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
40. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
41. Id. at 175.
42. See generally, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387
(1926); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
43. 438 U.S. at 129.
44. 272 U.S. at 394, 395.
45. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (the Court invalidated a
state statute which provided for the fixing of gasoline prices); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (the Court held invalid an act of Congress prescribing
minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia); Lochner v.
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PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that the questioned regulations did not reflect the promotion of a
legitimate state interest, the Court turned to recognizing legiti-
macy by judicial notice. 48 In Olsen v. Nebraska,49 the Court
stated, "We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need,
or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on
that score suggest a choice which 'should be left . . . to the states
and to Congress.' "50
Closely related to the second theme of legitimate state interest
is a third theme concerning the degree of relationship which the
regulatory action must bear to legitimate concerns. 51 In order to
be held constitutionally valid, a zoning ordinance must bear a
substantial relationship and be a reasonable means of achieving
the legitimate concerns of public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.52
Fourth, even though a regulation satisfies due process by pro-
moting a legitimate state interest, there can still be a taking
which requires compensation. An ordinance can be a perfectly
valid exercise of regulation while still exacting a taking of private
land requiring compensation.5 3 The case of Berman v. Parker5 4 is
illustrative. In that case the Court held that the District of Co-
lumbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was constitutional in that it
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (the Court held unconstitutional a New York labor
law restricting the number of hours which bakers could work); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (the Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana law making it
a misdemeanor for Louisiana residents to enter a contract with a New York insur-
ance company not licensed to do business in Louisiana); Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co.
v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (the Court held unconstitutional a Minnesota
statute authorizing a state commission to fix rates to be charged by railroads).
48. See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
50. Id.
51. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. at 188 (1928); Village of Euclid, 272
U.S. at 395.
52. 272 U.S. at 188. The Court found that a zoning ordinance violated the four-
teenth amendment because it did not bear a substantial relationship to public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare; reaching this decision even though it
found the ordinance in its general scope to be constitutional. In addition to the
reasonable or substantial relationship test, for land use regulations there is an ad-
ded balancing test. This test holds that the value of a regulation to the public
must be balanced against the loss of the individual landowner. BOSSELMAN SUpra
note 13 at 238.
53. See Developments in the Law---Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1427, 1462 (1978).
"Although a given measure may be reasonably related to health, safety, morals or
general welfare of society, it may still violate the 'taking clause' of the fifth amend-
ment .. " Id.
54. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
was instituted by Congress for the legitimate public purpose of
eliminating slums and substandard housing conditions.5 5 Regard-
less of how legitimate and noble its purpose, the Act called for the
taking of private property and the rights of the effected property
owners could only be satisfied "when they receive[d] the just
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of
the taking."56
A further illustration concerning this fourth theme is the case
of Hurley v. Kincaid.57 In Hurley, the Court reversed a lower
court's decision which granted injunctive relief as to enforcement
of an ordinance and instead gave the landowner monetary relief
in inverse condemnation. The ordinance pursued legitimate pub-
lic objectives but was flawed in that it failed to compensate the
landowner. Rather than strike down the ordinance and circum-
vent genuine governmental concern for public welfare, the Court
ordered just compensation. 58
Until the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City
of Tiburon ,59 the California rule held that a zoning law, which was
a valid exercise of police power, could nevertheless constitute a
taking requiring compensation. 60 The mere existence of a govern-
mental entity's power of eminent domain is evidence that while
property is taken for legitimate public uses, the private land own-
er must still be compensated for his loss.
The question of what constitutes a taking leads to the fifth com-
mon theme indicating that no physical invasion or appropriation
is required in order to find a taking.6 1 The Court has recognized
the inappropriateness of a physical invasion test in a modern so-
ciety where "intrusions of a non-physical nature are the rule
rather than the exception."62 In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
55. Id. at 28. Congress had made a legislative determination that eliminating
substandard living conditions was necessary to promote public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.
56. Id. at 36.
57. 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
58. Id. at 104.
59. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
60. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d. 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976). The original appellate opinion appeared at 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1975), but
was omitted from the official reporter because the California Supreme Court
granted a hearing on Eldridge and remanded the case for reconsideration in view
of its decision in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975). However, on remand the court of appeal reaffirmed its view that
an excessively restrictive zoning ordinance can constitute a taking and support an
action for damages. Willemsen and Phillips, Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zon-
ing in California Law, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 103, 105 (1979) (citing Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 633, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1976)).
61. See notes 18, 21 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Developments in the Law--Zoning, supra note 53, at 1468.
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York City, the Court stated that "we do not embrace the proposi-
tion that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has trans-
fered physical control over a portion of a parcel."63
Finally, to complete the judicial setting, the sixth recurring
theme attempts to define a taking, using the economic or diminu-
tion in value test. "The diminution in value test holds that where
state regulation causes too great a decrease in the market value of
a property holding, that regulation constitutes a taking compensa-
ble under the Fifth Amendment." 64
The diminution in value test was first expressed by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.65 Holmes stated that
when diminution in value reaches a certain magnitude, compen-
sation must be required 66 and that "makling] it commercially im-
practical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."67 Al-
though the decision in Pennsylvania Coal has been the object of
much criticism, 68 the United States Supreme Court continues to
cite it as authoritative. 69
In Penn Central7 0 and again in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,7 1
the Court identified two factors having particular significance in
determining when compensation is necessary: the economic im-
pact of the regulation upon the claimant and the extent to which
the regulation interferes with distinct and reasonable investment-
backed expectations. These factors are not necessarily determi-
native, but they do aid the Court in deciding whether compensa-
tion should be awarded.
An examination of these themes reveals a four-part test utilized
by the Agins Court. The four components are: the legitimacy of
state purpose, substantial relationship to that purpose, economic
63. 438 U.S. at 123 n.25.
64. Developments in the Law--Zoning, supra note 53, at 1476-77.
65. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
66. Id. at 413.
67. Id. at 414.
68. The decision in Pennsylvania Coal has been widely criticized by various
authors. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 13, at 124-40, 238, 240; Costonis, "Fair" Com-
pensation and the Accommodation Power, in REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN
LAND USE CONTROL 3 (1977); Berger, A Reply..., in REGULATION V. COMPENSA-
TION IN LAND USE CONTROL 67, 68 (1977).
69. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
70. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
71. 444 U.S. at 175.
impact upon the landowner, and a balancing of private loss
against public gain. The first three components are themes in
their own right, while the balancing component considers how the
interrelationship of all six themes produces a final result.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION AGAINST
CONSTITUTIONAL, FACTUAL, AND JUDICIAL BACKDROPS
Although the constitutional, factual, and judicial settings have
been independently discussed in the previous sections of this
casenote, there is a necessary overlapping of each, which sets a
single stage for the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Agins v. City of Tiburon. This analysis begins with a delineation
of those facts and issues properly before the Court.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance
of deciding cases, like Agins, on the circumstances and facts par-
ticular to each case. In Agins, the substantive facts before the
Court consisted of those facts appearing in the complaint 72 and
the two questioned California zoning ordinances. 73
At the initial proceeding in Agins, Tiburon's demurrer had the
effect of conceeding all averments of fact in the complaint to be
true. The appellants alleged that "the natural and proximate re-
sult of said Ordinance has been to prevent any sale, use, transfer
or development. . . [and] has resulted in the taking of Plaintiffs'
property... without due process of law and without any compen-
sation." 74
While California courts are prevented on demurrer from finding
facts contrary to those well pleaded in the complaint,75 they may
go outside the pleadings and consider matters that may be judi-
cially noticed under the California Evidence Code.76 In Agins,
the California Supreme Court took such judicial notice by com-
paring the allegations to the express terms of the ordinance.
Since the words of the ordinance allowed the construction of be-
tween one and five dwellings, the California Supreme Court re-
jected as a matter of law77 the appellants' "contention that the
72. Since the Superior Court sustained the demurrer and the California
Supreme Court affirmed, there was never a trial on the merits in which facts addi-
tional to those in the complaint could be introduced as evidence.
73. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
74. Complaint for Appellants at 7, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980).
75. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591, 487 P.2d 1241, 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
605 (1971).
76. A state court may take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. CAL. EviD.
CODE § 452(b) (West 1966).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2141 n.6. "Under California practice, allegations in a complaint
are taken to be true unless 'contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take
[Vol. 8: 839, 1981] Agins v. City of Tiburon
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ordinance prevented all use of the land."78 The United States
Supreme Court chose not to disturb the state court's action on
this point.7 9 Therefore, as Agins stood before the Court, not only
was there no record of a trial on the merits for the Court to con-
sider, but also, in a case standing on its pleadings alone, the im-
portant allegation that all use had been denied was barred from
the Court's consideration.
Noting that the appellants had not submitted a development
planSO to the city as the ordinances permitted, the Court con-
cluded that there was "no concrete controversy regarding the ap-
plication of the specific zoning provisions."81 This observation
could not lead to a refusal to hear the case altogether, because the
Court had previously held in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,82 that where equitable relief is sought there is no need for a
plaintiff to first submit a plan to the city for approval when the ef-
fect of the complaint is an attack on the ordinance as whole.83 Eu-
clid held that the mere existence and maintenance of an
unconstitutional zoning ordinance constitutes a present invasion
of property rights.8 4 Thus, the Court stated that in Agins the only
question properly before it was "whether mere enactment of the
zoning ordinance constitute[d] a taking."8 5 In so framing the
question for determination, the Court actually addressed itself
only to the Agins' claim for declaratory relief and left untouched
their claim for monetary relief by inverse condemnation. 86
judicial notice.'" Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 105, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 522 (1976). California courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordi-
nances. CAL. EVID. CODE § 452(b) (West 1966).
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2141 n.6.
79. Id. "The appellants' objection to the state supreme court's application of
state law does not raise a federal question appropriate for review by this court."
Id.
80. See note 26 supra for the requirements of such a plan.
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
82. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
83. Id. at 386.
84. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
86. "A 'declaratory judgment' is one which simply declares the rights of the
parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering
anything to be done .... 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgment § 1 (1956).
The essential distinction between a 'declaratory judgment action' and the
usual 'action' is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss
have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, al-
though there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the
asserted right will be invaded.
The Court's basic approach focused on the mere enactment and
therefore examined only the words of the ordinance and not its
true effect on the appellants. Yet here, the "economic or physical
reality may contradict" the purported uses granted by the words
of the ordinance. 87 Additionally, a focus on words alone, without
regard to their impact on constitutionally protected rights, is un-
likely to yield a proper result and is contradictory of the Court's
established record of factual inquiry in taking cases.88
Although the Court said no concrete controversy existed as to
the application of the specific zoning provisions because no devel-
opment plan had been filed, it began its analysis of the question
in Agins with a statement concerning the application of a general
zoning law. 89 Thus, the Court realized that examination of the fa-
cial quality of even a general zoning law must be accomplished
through scrutinizing its application to a particular property and,
therefore, its effect upon a particular plaintiff. In spite of this ac-
knowledgement, the Court proceeded to treat the facts relating to
effect only abstractly. It merely recited the words of the ordi-
nance and drew the conclusion that the ordinance had no sub-
stantially harmful effect upon the appellants. 90
After defining the only issue as whether mere enactment of the
ordinance constituted a taking, the Court applied each component
of the four-part taking test. Beginning with the first component,
the Court was quick to find that the zoning ordinances advanced a
legitimate state purpose.91 The Court recognized the intent of the
California legislature and the Tiburon City Council to protect so-
ciety from the "ill effects of urbanization" as a legitimate govern-
mental goal.92 For all practical purposes, this finding of legitimacy
was almost automatic.93
Id. Therefore, although no plan had been ified, the Agins' request for declaratory
relief was certainly proper and not premature.
87. Appellants' Brief at 10, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. at 2138.
88. See notes 33-41 supra and accompanying text.
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
90. As Professor Van Alystyne puts it, "With some exceptions the decisional
law is largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained
in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric [often ac-
companied] by the frequently reiterated judicial declaration that each case must
be decided on its own facts." Van Alystyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power:
The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CAL. L REV. 1 (1970) (em-
phasis added).
91. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
92. 100 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65561(b)).
93. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court stated that "once the
public purpose is established, the amount and character of the land to be taken
... rests in the discretion of the legislature." Id. at 35-36. Since legislative discre-
tion and intent seem to play such an important part in the Court's own determina-
tion of what types of purposes are legitimate and also in the amount and character
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Even when the legitimacy of state interest is fully recognized,
the zoning ordinance must bear a substantial relationship to the
legitimate interest.94 The Court reiterated the substantial rela-
tionship component as part of its Agins decision, finding that the
challenged Tiburon ordinance "substantially advances legitimate
governmental goals," because "it insures careful and orderly de-
velopment."95
In addition, the Agins Court also employed the balancing com-
ponent.96 The Court's choice of a balancing test which weighed
the public gain resulting from the regulation against the property
owner's individual loss is certainly appropriate, as it goes to the
very purpose of the fifth amendment. 97 Weighing the interests,
the Court found that the appellants would actually benefit from
the zoning ordinances because the ordinances serve "the city's in-
terest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential
property with provision for open-space areas." 98 Thus, the Court
decided the balancing test in favor of the city.
The Court's calculation that there was no economic burden im-
posed upon appellants is open to the charge of speculation for
two reasons. First, there was no trial record from which to draw
evidence in ascertaining economic impact. Secondly, the appel-
lants' allegation that all value had been destroyed was incorrectly
disregarded by the Court through its acceptance of the state
of the land to be taken, perhaps the Court would have done well to notice the leg-
islature's intent where the manner of the taking was concerned. Sections 6950 to
6954 of the California Government Code specifically authorize the acquisition of
private property for open space through the exercise of eminent domain of which
compensation is an important element. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954; Appellants'
Brief at 5, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138. Further still, § 65912 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code declares that it is not the intent of the open space article
to authorize adoption of open space zoning which will "take or damage private
property for public use without payment of just compensation." CA. GOV'T CODE
§ 65912 (West Supp. 1980). Justice Clark referred to this section in his dissent to
the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins.
94. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. at 188; Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395.
95. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
96. Id. at 2142. Some commentators object to the use of the balancing test for
compensation issues because as long as public benefit is great enough, private
property values may be completely destroyed without remedy. See Haley, Balanc-
ing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process of Tak-
ing Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315, 333-34 (1979).
97. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
98. 100 S. Ct. at 2142. How the appellants can benefit when they are not even
residents of Tiburon and the only effect of the ordinance on them has been to de-
crease their property's value is difficult to imagine.
court's denial of appellants' allegation that the ordinance had pre-
vented all use.99
Facts are of particular importance "when the legal issue is as
diffuse as the balancing test."100 "The absence of clear theoretical
guidelines makes the facts become more important than the law.
What goes into the balance is more important than the process of
balancing."101 As is readily ascertainable, the Court put words
from the ordinance on one side of the scale and pure speculation
as to these words' effect on the other.102 What seems to be
needed in order to tip the balance in favor of a private owner is
total loss of value by physical destruction, as was the case in
Berman v. Parker.103
Even if a state interest is found legitimate, the state can still be
required to compensate the plaintiff.104 In addition to judicial pre-
cedent, the Constitution does not find legitimate state interest
and required compensation to be mutually exclusive of the other.
Rather, "the Fifth Amendment presupposes that [property] is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation."' 05
Agins v. City of Tiburon presented both a due process and com-
pensation claim.106 Therefore, once due process had been satis-
fied 07 by finding a legitimate state interest, the analysis needed
to move away from a focus on the quality of the action and to the
quantity of the action. For the compensation issue the major em-
phasis must shift to the degree of the taking. In Agins, the Court
properly made such a transition by addressing itself to the aspect
of the economic impact component of the taking test. While rec-
ognizing the judicially settled "economic viability" standard'0 8 or
diminution in value test,109 the Court's treatment of the economic
impact in Agins is equally as disappointing as its balancing meth-
ods. According to its decisions in Penn Central and Kaiser Aetna,
deciding questions of economic impact should be the result offac-
99. See notes 77-79 and 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
100. BOSSELMAN, supra note 13, at 284.
101. Id. at 293.
102. See note 127 infra.
103. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See also notes 55 and 56 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
106. Complaint for Appellants at 7, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. at 2138.
107. The central idea of substantive due process as it relates to zoning regula-
tion, is that all individuals must relinquish some property rights for public good,
but only when the governmental action passes specific minimal standards. Haley,
supra note 96, at 321. These minimal standards are that the law must not be "un-
necessary, unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary, or capricious." Id. at 320.
108. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
109. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
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tual inquiry."i0 In assessing the economic impact on the Agins,
the Court found that "the appellants may be permitted to build as
many as five houses on their five acres. . . ."M On this basis
alone the Court concluded that "the appellants are free to pursue
their reasonable investment expectation by submitting a develop-
ment plan to local officials."" 2
Where the established judicial standard is factual inquiry,113
the Court's examination of economic impact was highly specula-
tive. Lacking the relevant facts on which to base such a decision,
the Court declared that a density of one single-family dwelling
per acre is likely to yield a reasonable investment." 4
Although the appellants did not specifically allege their inabil-
ity to realize a reasonable investment, they did allege that under
the ordinance the value of their property was completely de-
stroyed.115 This particular allegation was before the Court as an
uncontroverted fact 1 6 on appeal. Although the state supreme
court had rejected the allegation that the ordinance prevented all
110. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124; Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. at 175.
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2142 (emphasis added).
112. Id. TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S. § 10-4 (G) (1) (a) and (b). As far as
being in a position to pursue one's reasonable investment by plan submission,
how can the Court reasonably expect a landowner, who has challenged the ordi-
nance on the basis that it is no longer economically feasible to develop the prop-
erty, to then spend a great sum of money in having a master plan drawn up and
submitted which may subsequently be rejected for failure to meet vague require-
ments such as "relevant human needs for openspace, views, variety, harmony
within the development and the surrounding areas, and clarity of organization"?
TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCE 123 N.S. § 10-4(G) (1) (b) (3) (1973), see note 26 supra for
a discussion of expenses involved in the submission of such plans.
113. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
114. Particular facts and even expert testimony is especially important in land
use cases. BOSSELMAN, supra note 13, at 293. When considering investment re-
turn, there are two cost factors to be considered. The first is land cost. The Agins'
basis or cost of the property would have remained the same regardless of how
many units they were permitted to build. However, the second factor, improve-
ment costs, is the crucial consideration in determining investment return. Im-
provement costs include such items as planning and engineering, soils and
geology, permits and fees, streets, sewers, and storm drains. When improvement
costs are divided by five homes instead of 10 or 20, the result may very well be that
the owner will not be able to get a reasonable return on his investment. Further,
all reasonable use of the property may be denied in that this result affects market-
ability.
115. Complaint for Appellants at 7, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138.
116. See note 75 and accompanying text. Evidently the Supreme Court took the
same course of action with regard to value as the California court had taken on
use. The California court took judicial notice that all use had not been denied.
The Supreme Court took this finding one step farther by deciding that since all
development, 1 7 it did not reject the allegation of a decrease in
value." 8
In Penn Central, the Court emphasized that its holding that a
landmark preservation law had not taken the appellants' property
was based on the appellants' "present ability to use the [prop-
erty] in a gainful fashion." 119 However, in Agins, the Court
looked only to a speculative future ability to use the land gain-
fully under the ordinance.
Concluding its economic analysis, the Court stated that "it can-
not be said that the impact of general land-use regulations has de-
nied appellants the 'justice and fairness' guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." 120 The validity of this statement
as to actual impact and effect, when facts had been given at
best-superficial treatment, is questionable considering the stage
set by constitutional and judicial principles.
This analysis has offered a look at the methods employed by
the Agins Court, with any negative criticism directed not at the
final determination of "no taking," but rather at the Court's depar-
ture from the established precendent of deciding takings cases on
the facts and circumstances particular to each case.'21 However,
the facts and circumstances of Agins may very well have com-
pelled the departure. The Court may have felt it could avoid the
greatest amount of speculation by reaching a "no taking" result.
While this determination definitely required the use of specula-
tion, an opposite decision would perhaps have required more.
Due to the demurrer by the City of Tiburon at the trial stage, all
facts consisted only of those in the complaint and the two ordi-
nances of which the California court took judicial notice. 12 2 In
dealing with the facts concerning economic harm, the Supreme
Court evidently dismissed the Agins' allegation of loss of all value
of the property when it acknowledged the California court's dis-
use had not been denied, the rezoned property remained valuable. See note 117
supra and accompanying text.
117. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
378. "According to the wording of the ordinance, of which we may take note, the
RPD-1 zoning allows plaintiffs to build between one and five residences on their
property. This belies plaintiffs' claim that development of their land is forever pre-
vented." Id. Implicit in the plaintiffs' claim was the argument that the ordinance
prevented all profitable development.
118. Id. The California court did recognize a decrease in the value of the prop-
erty but labeled such decrease as permissible.
119. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36. The Court in this case noted that the
city had conceded that if in the future appeUants could demonstrate that the per-
mitted use had ceased to be "economically viable," appellants could obtain relief.
However, the Agins do not have the benefit of such a concession.
120. 100 S. Ct. at 2142.
121. See notes 33-41 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
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missal of the averment of loss of all use.123 The Court was there-
fore left with no facts indicating the degree of economic harm.
Feeling comfortable with the likelihood that at least some value
must have remained, the Court declared that appellants were free
to pursue their reasonable investment by plan submission.124
Thus, the Court apparently set the standard that no economic
loss will be recognized where the opportunity for plan submission
yet remains.125 In a further attempt to avoid speculation, the
Court took additional advantage of the circumstance that no plan
had been filed. The Court shifted its emphasis away from applica-
tion of specific provisions of the ordinance and focused on the
mere enactment.126 By defining their emphasis as "mere enact-
ment," it seems the Court felt it did not have to seriously consider
the ordinances' effect upon the appellants. 27 It could therefore
123. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
124. 100 S. Ct. at 2142.
125. In keeping with the state court's finding that "a zoning ordinance may be
unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the
landowner of substantially all reasonable use," Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d
at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378, the Supreme Court's new standard of
economic loss seems to suggest that all value must be denied before a taking re-
quiring compensation will be found.
126. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
127. The Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
also refused to deal with specific provisions of the ordinance. In Euclid, as in
Agins, the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance was challenged prior to any at-
tempt on the part of the complainant to obtain a building permit. 272 U.S. at 386.
The Euclid Court refused to decide the impact of the provisions of the ordinance
upon those questioning its validity. In refusing to so decide, the Court said it had
no basis other than speculation for such a determination. 272 U.S. at 397. The
Court said,
What would be the effect of a restraint imposed by one of the innumerable
provisions of the ordinance, considered apart, upon the value or marketa-
bility of the lands is neither disclosed by the bill nor by the evidence, and
we are afforded no basis, apart from speculation, upon which to rest a con-
clusion that it or they would have any appreciable effect upon those mat-
ters.
Id. Therefore, the Euclid Court chose only to determine that the general scope of
the ordinance was constitutionally valid. Due to the claim presented, the Euclid
Court could forego consideration of the effect of the provisions, because Euclid in-
volved a fourteenth amendment due process claim. "[TJhe minimal requirement
of substantive due process, focuses on the taking ... where no compensation is
required and asks whether the government has acted properly." Haley, supra
note 96, at 325-26. The ordinance in Euclid was held constitutional as a "Valid ex-
ercise of authority .. " 272 U.S. at 397. Therefore, there was no need for the
Court to examine the effect of various provisions in order to reach a decision on
the claim presented.
The Agins Court was not afforded the luxury of legitimately overlooking the pro-
visions and their effect. Agins presented a fifth amendment taking without com-
avoid outright speculation and draw a conclusion that no substan-
tial harm occurred without appearing negligent.
V. CONCLUSION
As a concrete indication of the United State Supreme Court's
present attitude on zoning and fifth amendment takings, Agins v.
City of Tiburon represents only the Court's continued reluctance
to take such a meaningful stand. Perhaps the Agins Court's re-
luctance was a product of unspoken policy considerations. If the
Court had found a taking, it would have been left to make one of
two choices, either to invalidate the ordinance, or to require the
payment of just compensation. To require payment could have
meant severe adverse economic consequences for the City of
Tiburon. To invalidate the ordinance would have left coastal land
unprotected or paved the way for a subsequent ordinance only
slightly less restrictive.128 Additionally, if the Court found a tak-
ing, it would have had to actively deal with the issue of whether
inverse condemnation should be available as a remedy for ag-
grieved property owners, a decision which many Californians ea-
gerly awaited.
In determining whether a compensable taking has occurred,
Agins infers that diligent factual inquiry is no longer the stan-
dard. Furthermore, Agins sets the precedent that as long as a
zoning ordinance allows some use and makes provision for the
pursuit of one's reasonable investment expectation by allowing
plan submission for the regulating authority's approval, no eco-
nomic loss in value will be recognized.129 Finally, Agins leaves an
aggrieved landowner without the previously available remedy of
inverse condemnation, limiting him to the remedies of declaratory
relief and mandamus.
Agins is particularly important in view of the current concern
for the protection of the environment. The result of such concern
inevitably means the enactment of more zoning restrictions. With
pensation claim. A compensation analysis "considers whether the government
has taken more from an individual than he should fairly be expected to give up
without compensation." Haley, supra note 96, at 326. Necessarily, the Agins Court
"had" to consider the ordinance's provisions in order to determine how much, if
anything, had been taken.
128. See Willemsen and Phillips, supra note 60, at 116.
129. To hold that economic harm cannot be established where a complainant
has not yet filed a plan seems clearly unreasonable. It would be unreasonable to
require economic waste through the expenditure of substantial funds to have a
plan drawn which does not conform to zoning requirements merely to show dam-
age. Such a requirement might even be prejudicial in that it would bar the small
landowner from challenging an ordinance due to his inability to commit economic
waste.
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the trend seeming to be the elevation of environmentalism over
recognition of constitutionally protected rights, the legislatures, if
not the courts, need to put matters back in proper prospective.
There is no reason why protection of the environment and protec-
tion of constitutional rights cannot peacefully co-exist. Although
traditional alternatives may not strike the balance, there are alter-
natives that can.130
JERMAINE CHASTAIN
130. See Krasnowiecki and Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open Space:
A Means of Controlling Urban Growth, in No LAND Is AN ISLAND 141 (1975). The
authors present the alternative of paying compensation, not when the regulation is
imposed, but only when the owner sells at a loss on the open market. Id. at 143.
Under their proposal, the regulating entity guarantees the fair market value of the
property just prior to regulation. If upon the sale of such property on the open
market the amount realized is less than the amount guaranteed, the regulating en-
tity must pay the difference. Id. at 153. See also Costonis, "Fair" Compensation
and the Accommodation Power, in REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 3 (1977). Costonis believes that there is a "deadlock" in the present
treatment of taking cases because such treatment cannot accommodate both the
government and private landowners. He feels that a third power, the "accommo-
dation" power, must be introduced "to fill the void that currently divides the police
and eminent domain powers." Id. at 4. See also Berger, supra note 68. In summa-
rizing Costonis's accommodation theory, Berger makes the following observations.
The accommodation theory is activated when an owner is denied "reasonable
use." There is no need for the regulation to be nullified or for traditional compen-
sation. Instead, the accommodation power provides the following options: (1) a
variance that would allow reasonable beneficial use; (2) payment in dollars for the
difference between the land's value for reasonable beneficial use and its controlled
value; or (3) a fair compensation in a non-dollar manner such as tax benefits or
the issuance of transferable development rights. Id. at 68.

